voussoir

Per-window allowlists

A window that renders untrusted content should not be able to call the whole app. Voussoir lets you narrow one window's command surface, at startup or when the window is opened, and the narrowing can only ever remove.

In voussoir.json

{
  "commands": ["greet", "save", "delete"],
  "windows": { "preview": { "commands": ["greet"] } }
}

A window labelled preview can call greet and nothing else. The intersection rule is the important part: the effective list is the window's list and the global list. A windows entry can therefore never grant a command the app withheld, which means a config file cannot be used to escalate.

At runtime

let label = app.open_window(WindowOptions {
    title: Some("Preview".to_owned()),
    allowlist: Some(vec!["greet".to_owned()]),
    ..Default::default()
})?;

The narrowing is registered before the window exists, so its page can never make a call it will not be allowed to keep making. From the page, the same thing:

await window.voussoir.invoke("__voussoir_open_window", {
  label: "preview",
  title: "Preview",
  allowlist: ["greet"],
});

The built-in answers {"label": "preview"}, so the page can address the window it just opened.

Where the label comes from

The shell reads the calling window's label from the webview the request arrived on, never from the payload. A page cannot claim another window's permissions by sending a label of its own; there is no field for one.

What a denial looks like

kind: "unknown", the same answer an unregistered command gets. A narrowed window cannot probe for the commands it is missing, which is the point: a preview window that can distinguish "not allowed" from "does not exist" has learned part of the app's surface.

Proof

bun scripts/verify.ts builds a window with a strict list, calls out of it, and asserts the denial arrives over the real transport on Linux, Windows and macOS. The ipc unit tests cover the intersection rule and the per-window lookup directly.

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